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make them an active danger, but I have not gathered the impression that they are that as yet. I am more apprehensive of the newspapers, whose influence is certainly increasing, but I find that my apprehensions are sincerely shared by leading Chinese officials, and I take some comfort from the fact that Chinese officials suffer acutely from newspaper attacks. On two or three occasions in Peking when liberty of speech has become licence drastic measures have been taken or means found to abate the nuisance. On the other hand it is said, and I think with truth, that the officials generally find it simpler to turn newspaper criticism from themselves by pointing to the foreigner.
an
As far as the Government and officials are concerned, I see no reason to credit them with a stronger anti-foreign tendency, direct or indirect, than they have always had. It is Young China-the students-coming rapidly into the field and jostling for position, who are, I think, chiefly responsible for the impressions of increased hostility set down by Mr. Little. This class, largely educated in Japan, is at present as much anti-official, or even anti-dynastic, as anti-foreign, and their policy is to follow in the footsteps of Young Japan, who succeeded in ridding the country of foreign domination and becoming a great Power in ordinary lifetime. They are increasing in number out of all proportion to the employment available for them, and are commencing to wield an influence which requires watching. Those of them who were educated abroad seem to lose no oppor- tunity of depreciating foreign countries and of creating an atmosphere of contempt of the foreigner and his ways, and the ignorance of their fellow-countrymen in external matters facilitates the process. But belonging in the main to the gentry class, students can always be controlled by the officials if the will exists and proper means are taken, and though they get out of hand rather too frequently, I think that up to the present the executive officials have not hesitated in their own interests to control them when their proceedings became a menace to public order.
Mr. Little's remarks on the provincial assemblies seem to be a little sweeping. No doubt they share the universal anti-foreign spirit, and will do all in their power to nullify treaty privileges, but the first sitting of November-December 1909 passed off in twenty provincial capitals with surprising calm, and so far as one can safely judge, the assemblies worked more easily with the local executives than foreigners or Chinese anticipated. They may, as he says, become centres of disaffection, but if they are merely a new lot of men requiring their share of the public plunder (as he also says), they are more likely to gain this end by co-operating with the existing Government than by disaffection. The provincial assemblies, as at present constituted, are, as I have said elsewhere, the gentry from whom the great bulk of the officials spring, and under existing social conditions it is obviously in the interests of the gentry that the provincial governments and themselves should not work at cross-purposes. Provincial interests, which were little considered under the old régime, are naturally being pushed to the front by the provincial assemblies with a new solidarity, and there is certain to be more powerful and steady resistance to the inroads of the Central Government on the material resources of the provinces. At the same time nobody knows better than the Chinese gentry how easily disaffection develops into rebellion, and how much they stand to lose if this happens.
Mr. Little's description of the railway agitation is in the main correct, but I do not think that Peking is necessarily so helpless as he represents. The attitude of the provinces, it is well known, is due to the great financial success of the northern railways rather than to fears of foreign control, and the efforts of the gentry to keep similar plums to themselves and out of the hands of the Central Government are made more in the ordinary pursuit of their material interests than for patriotic reasons. This is thoroughly understood by the Central Government, who hold the trump card in being able to borrow foreign money at 5 per cent., and thereby being in position to build the railways more cheaply than the provinces, who are unable to enter the foreign markets for money at any price, and must rely on native capital in a country where interest rates are double those of Europe. Chinese investors have small faith in their own official enterprises, and the muddle made by the provincial railway bureaux has destroyed what little confidence there was, and made it highly improbable that the capital necessary for railways can be drawn from Chinese sources. It follows that all the Central Government has to do is to withhold funds, and the provinces must yield or postpone railway construction. But I think that postponement would be the least likely alternative for the simple reason that railways in China, economically built and prudently managed, are lucrative undertakings.
Mr. Little is not correct in saying that all the foreigners on the Peking-
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Hankow Railway have been discharged, and his description of the condition of the line is overdrawn. When the Chinese took control a large proportion of the foreign staff was dispensed with, but I was informed lately by a foreign employé that, the unwisdom of this course was soon borne upon the board of communications and that there have been recent additions to the foreign personnel.
The voluntary subscription craze has some effect in fanning anti-foreign sentiment. The general impression at the moment is that it is only a passing phrase of no real importance, and much more likely to enrich individuals than assist the redemption of the foreign loans, provide ships, or build railways.
Halley's comet will have a certain disturbing influence no doubt in accordance with precedent, but the extent of it will depend on other concurrent factors. The comet of the end of January, which was visible in Peking after sunset for some days, merely excited wonder.
I must leave the new army to the military attaché, who has lately returned from a tour among the camps on the Lower Yang-tsze, but I should mention from my experience in various parts of China, that it is often a question how far the troops can be depended upon. The loyalty of Chinese soldiers is a matter of treatment, and that again is a question of the command of the officers. In Chiêng tu, during the excitement of the Russo-Japanese war, it never crossed the mind of any of the foreign community isolated beyond reach, that the troops were to be feared, because there was general confidence in the command. On the other hand, I recollect that in Peking after the China-Japan war, there was universal and justifiable apprehension amongst foreigners and Chinese on account of the known character of the general of one of the armies encamped near the city. At present there is no such apprehension for similar reasons. I may add that the system of bringing in strangers from another province as a counterpoise, to the local levies is an old one, and has not worked badly in the past.
The finances are pretty much in the condition stated by Mr. Little. Modernity is bringing expense in its train, and the Government requires more money for army and navy, education, and unproductive works. The prices of necessaries have risen- our head writer tells me that he pays to-day for rice 118d. a pound, which he bought ten years ago for 65d., and the masses are taxed more and are doubtless feeling the pinch in many parts of the country. Such conditions do not make for peace, and while they last, it behoves foreigners, especially missionaries in the interior, to be on the watch and to take precautions. But I think it is recognised that the Chinese are lightly taxed on the whole, and all that is wanted is a modern system and moderately honest collection. There is a horde of vested interests to battle against which the Board of Finance, headed by Duke Tsê, has not yet overcome, and cannot be expected to overcome quickly.
I now come to the most important of Mr. Little's points, the weakness of the Central Government. The Regent is young, and from the Chinese standpoint woefully inexperienced, and his right-hand men are his two brothers, who are younger. He is not considered weak in character, but the sudden removal of Yüan Shib-k'ai, and later of Tuan Fang, the two leading statesmen of force and initiative, and the great reliance he places on his two brothers, who are commonly reported to be reaping a golden harvest in consequence, have produced a momentous feeling of insecurity amongst the high officials of the Empire. No one can be sure of what may happen in a contentious matter of magnitude, and the result is that few dare to assume a shred of responsibility in such cases. The aged Prince Ching is the sole member of the Grand Council who can consider himself safe and in a position to give unpalatable advice to the Regent The two other Manchus, Shih-hsü and Na-t'ung, are amiable men whose guiding principle is to avoid giving offence at any cost; and of the two Chinese Grand Councillors, one is physically incapable and the other a mere clerk. The authority of the Central Government, which has been on the decline since 1900, is now probably at the lowest point in the history of this dynasty, and it is this fact which constitutes the chief danger of the moment. So far as I can gather the Chinese official world are waiting and hoping for some one to come forward who has the ear of the Regent and the strength to assume responsibility, and are doing their best to mark time until this happens. But it cannot be doubted that Court and Government are at present alike sincerely anxious to avoid other than paper attacks on the foreigner, and the masses being the least anti-foreign of the Chinese race, the future cannot be considered so black for us as Mr. Little paints it.
Any old resident in China feels that anti-foreign disturbances are always possible
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